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Abstract
While a growing number of firms are being evaluated on environment, social and governance (ESG) criteria by sustainability 
rating agencies (SRAs), comparatively little is known about companies’ responses. Drawing on semi-structured interviews 
with companies operating in Italy, the present paper seeks to narrow this gap in current understanding by examining how 
firms react to ESG ratings, and the factors influencing their response. Unique to the literature, we show that firms may react 
very differently to being rated, with our analysis yielding a fourfold typology of corporate responses. The typology captures 
conformity and resistance to ratings across two dimensions of firm behaviour. We furthermore show that corporate responses 
depend on managers’ beliefs regarding the material benefits of adjusting to and scoring well on ESG ratings and their align-
ment with corporate strategy. In doing so, we challenge the idea that organisational ratings homogenise organisations and 
draw attention to the agency underlying corporate responses. Our findings also contribute to debates about the impact of ESG 
ratings, calling into question claims about their positive influence on companies’ sustainability performance. We conclude 
by discussing the wider empirical, theoretical and ethical implications of our paper.
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Introduction
An increasing number of companies are being evaluated by 
entities known as sustainability rating agencies (referred to 
hereafter as SRAs or rating agencies) (Busch et al. 2016; 
Drempetic et al. 2019). The ratings they produce are primar-
ily intended to provide stakeholders with data on various 
environment, social and governance (ESG) indicators. These 
indicators are increasingly framed by SRAs as capturing 
firms’ exposure to, and management of, various non-finan-
cial risks and opportunities. The growing role of ESG ratings 
is constitutive of a broader trend towards an “audit society” 
(Power 1997) wherein ‘the principles and techniques of 
accountancy and financial management are applied to the 
governance of people and organisations’ (Shore and Wright 
2015, p. 24). It can also be conceptualised as symptomatic of 
a shift toward neoliberal modes of governance emphasising 
transparency, accountability and market discipline (Chris-
tophers 2017).
Past research concerned with ESG ratings has largely 
been preoccupied with examining the statistical relation-
ship between corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related 
performance (as measured by one or more ESG metric) 
and financial performance (e.g. Aouadi and Marsat 2018; 
Duque-Grisales and Aguilera-Caracuel 2019). The present 
paper examines a different set of issues which have received 
far less attention, namely: (a) how firms respond to being 
rated; (b) the reasons for their response; and (c) whether 
ESG ratings contribute to substantive improvements in 
firms’ sustainability performance. That comparatively lim-
ited work has been undertaken into corporate responses 
is perhaps surprising. ESG ratings provide one of the few 
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comparable sources of data on a wide range of CSR-related 
policies, practices and performances (Crane et al. 2019). 
As such, ratings might be expected to assume considerable 
strategic significance to firms, most notably by influencing 
how key audiences perceive, value and engage with them 
(Martins 2005). Foremost amongst these are investors who, 
it is suggested, increasingly use ESG data to govern the ethi-
cal and sustainability behaviour of firms in which they invest 
(Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 2018; van Duuren et al. 2016). 
Analysing firms’ responses provides an opportunity to bet-
ter understand whether and, if so, how, external evaluations 
shape corporate decision-making and action in the area of E, 
S and G (Chrun et al. 2016). This is important for scrutinis-
ing claims about the substantive contribution of information-
based governance to CSR, and whether such approaches give 
rise to substantive or symbolic change (Depoers et al. 2016; 
Kim and Lyon 2011). A better understanding of corporate 
responses is also important because it sheds light on the 
sustainability implications of the growing amounts of capital 
which, to a greater or lesser degree, is being invested taking 
account of ESG-related factors (Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 
2018; Drempetic et al. 2019).
Based on in-depth interviews with sustainability manag-
ers in Italian companies, we make several important contri-
butions. The first is to provide novel insights into how firms 
respond to being rated. Previous work on ESG ratings has 
tended to narrowly frame the range of possible responses, 
for example, in terms of the degree to which firms “improve” 
their environmental or social performance following evalu-
ation (Chatterji and Toffel 2010; Slager and Chapple 2016). 
Answering calls for more disaggregated analyses in studies 
of organisational ratings (Szper 2013), our inquiry reveals a 
more diverse set of responses to ratings. Categorising these 
responses yields a fourfold typology, which we label as ‘pas-
sive conformity’, ‘active conformity’, ‘passive resistance’ 
and ‘active resistance’. In identifying this heterogeneity, we 
challenge the idea that firms are unconditionally governed by 
ratings (Chelli and Gendron 2013), and expose the agency 
underlying corporate responses to external evaluation.
A second contribution is to shed light on the reasons why 
firms may react differently to being rated. Past studies have 
had comparatively little to say about this issue, beyond locat-
ing a handful of measurable determinants (e.g. current score) 
which lead certain firms to improve their environmental and/
or social performance more than others. Our analysis reveals 
that whether firms conform to, or resist, the requirements 
of ESG ratings largely depends on commercial rather than 
wider ethical considerations. More specifically, corporate 
responses depend on managers’ perceptions regarding the 
business value of positively responding to ESG ratings, and 
their alignment with wider corporate objectives and strat-
egy. In making these observations, our study helps con-
nect work on ESG ratings with a longer-standing body of 
literature concerned with strategic, materiality-based drivers 
of CSR (Clemens and Douglas 2005; Malik 2015; Pedersen 
and Gwozdz 2014). Based on self-reported evaluations, a 
third contribution is to offer insights into whether ESG rat-
ings impact firms’ substantive sustainability performance1 
(Perez-Batres et al. 2012). Our findings sound a note of cau-
tion toward claims about the positive influence of ESG rat-
ings (Oekom 2017; Shvarts et al. 2018): although contribut-
ing to enhanced CSR-related organisational capabilities, few 
of our respondents believed that SRAs’ evaluations made 
a significant difference to firms’ substantive sustainability 
performance. Indeed, to the extent that some firms in the 
sample “gamed” ESG ratings, there is a danger that exter-
nal evaluations may encourage firms to engage in ethically 
irresponsible actions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The “Literature 
Review” section introduces ESG ratings and provides an 
overview of prior studies. Next, drawing on salient litera-
tures, we theorise corporate responses and their determi-
nants. “Research Design and Methods” describes our meth-
odology, sample and data collection. Findings are presented 
in the “Results and Analysis” section, followed by a discus-
sion of the main contributions of the work. The final section 
offers concluding remarks, and reflects on the wider implica-
tions of the paper for theory, practice and business ethics.
Literature Review
A Primer on ESG Ratings
ESG ratings are ‘evaluations of a company based on a 
comparative assessment of their quality, standard or per-
formance on environmental, social or governance issues’ 
(SustainAbility 2018, p. 4). SRAs evaluate firms, and supply 
data, on specific attributes within E, S and G categories—
such as pollutant emissions, human rights and management 
(Avetisyan and Hockerts 2017). They also invariably provide 
an overall rating of firms’ performance based on a composite 
score of individual ESG issues. Many agencies additionally 
produce ESG- and/or sustainability-themed indices, com-
prising lists of companies—selected from a wider universe 
of rated companies—which meet certain ESG thresholds. 
Some noteworthy examples are the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index (DJSI), the FTSE4Good Index, and the MSCI ESG 
Indices (Searcy and Elkhawas 2012).
1 By substantive, we refer to firms’ environmental performance (e.g. 
reduced emissions or resource consumption) or organisational capa-
bilities which are required to fulfil meaningful commitments to sus-
tainability (Hyatt and Berente 2017).
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Rating agencies typically make their evaluations based 
on publicly available information (e.g. from mandatory 
non-financial disclosures), third-party research, firms’ sus-
tainability/integrated reports and information on corpo-
rate websites (Jackson et al. 2019). Some agencies, such 
as RobecoSAM, send questionnaires to firms, while others 
provide companies the opportunity to review and comment 
on profiles before finalising them. SRAs employ a range 
of 70 to 1000 indicators on different issues (Abramskiehn 
et al. 2015).
The past decade has witnessed growing investor demand 
for ESG data in response to, amongst other factors, increased 
awareness of the financial materiality of ESG factors and 
increased client demand such as that from asset owners (van 
Duuren et al. 2016). Investors use ESG ratings in several 
ways, including assessing and managing their exposure to 
ESG-related risks, and engaging with investee companies. 
Likewise, sustainability indices are commonly employed to 
assess the performance of responsible firms against a wider 
set of comparable peers, as well as to construct responsible 
investment products (Slager et al. 2012).
ESG ratings have received a mixed reception. For their 
proponents, ratings address information asymmetries by pro-
viding comprehensive, systematised and comparable data 
for a significant number of publicly listed firms. In doing 
so, they play an important role in helping stakeholders 
apprehend, evaluate and manage the increasingly complex, 
multi-faceted nature of business ethics and sustainability 
(Cappucci 2018). Yet ratings have also attracted consid-
erable criticism. One set of critiques have focused on the 
underlying data quality (Doyle 2018; Drempetic et al. 2019). 
Others have questioned the validity of ESG ratings, with 
studies documenting non-trivial differences in the way that 
different SRAs conceptualise E, S and G, and the weights 
used to compile scores (Chatterji et al. 2016; Semenova and 
Hassel 2015). More fundamental critiques have centred on 
how ratings seek to define, naturalise or impose a common 
framework for the measurement of social and environmental 
responsibility (Chelli and Gendron 2013). Far from being 
neutral, such rating frameworks can be interpreted as social 
and commercial constructions, with different SRAs pur-
posely seeking to differentiate their ratings offer from those 
of competitors (Eccles and Stroehle 2018). Such observa-
tions raise ethical questions about how firms’ ESG perfor-
mance is being defined, measured and framed by what are 
predominantly profit-oriented intermediaries.
Previous Work on Corporate Responses to ESG 
Ratings
Only a relatively small number of studies have examined 
how firms respond to ESG ratings. Chelli and Gendron 
(2013) highlight how ratings ‘promote a regime of exclusion 
and inclusion’ (p. 200), creating reward systems for high 
performance firms (e.g. by including them in a select index), 
whilst sanctioning firms scoring less well (e.g. by excluding 
them). Supporting these ideas, Slager and Chapple’s (2016) 
statistical analysis finds that firms facing exclusion from the 
FTSE4Good Index following the introduction of new criteria 
were more likely to improve their performance in the follow-
ing year, as were firms which actively advertised the fact that 
they were part of the Index. Chatterji and Toffel (2010) take 
a wider perspective, providing large sample evidence that 
US firms which received low scores on environmental rat-
ings improved their performance (as measured by corporate-
wide toxic pollution) more than their peers never rated or 
that received a more positive evaluation. Adopting a similar 
approach, Sharkey and Bromley (2014) investigate the indi-
rect effects of ESG ratings, showing that rated firms (but 
not unrated ones) reduced their pollution more as a greater 
share of their counterparts were rated. The idea that firms are 
responsive to ESG ratings also finds some support in quali-
tative work. Using survey evidence, Searcy and Elkhawas 
(2012) report several steps taken by Canadian firms seeking 
to be included in, and remain within, the DJSI. Likewise, 
Shvarts et al. (2018) show that oil and gas firms operating in 
Russia disclosed more environment-related information after 
the introduction of a third-party environmental rating, with 
some adjustments in the format in which they reported data.
Three further contributions offer a more critical perspec-
tive on ESG ratings. Using formal mathematical modelling, 
Adam and Shavit (2008) show that, through their limited 
membership lists, sustainability indices create inadequate 
incentives for most excluded firms to invest in CSR. In 
line with this result, Scalet and Kelly’s (2009) empirical 
study finds that most firms did little to publicly acknowl-
edge or address the negative factors which contributed to 
them being dropped from major CSR rankings. Gauthier and 
Wooldridge (2018) invoke the idea of compensatory tactics. 
Aware that many SRAs allow high scores in certain dimen-
sions of CSR to compensate for poor ones in others, the 
authors suggest that firms may respond to low CSR ratings 
by investing in less costly and disruptive non-core business 
practices (as opposed to core ones).
In the next section, we develop our own theoretical ideas, 
exploring the case that firms may variously conform to, as 
well as resist, ESG ratings.
Theorising Corporate Responses
Conformity to Ratings
Our starting point for thinking about firm responses to 
ESG ratings comes from a literature which has explored 
the impact of ratings and rankings in other (i.e. non-ESG) 
domains of organisational life (e.g. Martins 2005; Pollock 
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et al. 2018; Szper 2013). A key suggestion of this work is 
that evaluation systems interact with, and moreover shape, 
the very objects they seek to evaluate. In a widely cited con-
tribution, Espeland and Sauder (2007) invoke the idea of 
reactivity to capture these dynamics, arguing that organi-
sations adapt to principles, values and criteria embedded 
in ratings and ranking measures. The authors identify two 
key mechanisms underlying reactivity. The first is through 
so-called “self-fulfilling prophesies”, described as ‘pro-
cesses by which reactions to social measures confirm the 
expectations or predictions that are embedded in measures 
or which increase the validity of the measure by encouraging 
behaviour that conforms to it’ (p. 11). Another mechanism 
is “commensuration” whereby organisations are compared 
against one another using a common metric, itself depend-
ent on efforts to ‘reduce and simplify disparate information 
into numbers’ (Espeland and Stevens 1998, p. 316). Com-
mensuration affects cognition, rendering certain dimensions 
of quality salient, authoritative and real, whilst deflecting 
attention from others.
An important insight from Espeland and Sauder’s work is 
that, while rated entities may exhibit considerable scepticism 
toward rankings, they nevertheless often respond to them. 
Such reactivity stems from the belief that the decision-mak-
ing of external stakeholders is influenced by organisational 
evaluations (see also Martins 2005). This motivates reflex-
ive, anticipatory action, both from the promise of positive 
prospects which might come from a higher score/ranking, 
but also the fear of the negative implications of a falling 
or unfavourable one. To this end, rated entities may pay 
increased attention to the data and methodology underpin-
ning ratings, and allocate greater resources to areas which 
are known to boost scores.
The idea of organisational alignment with externally 
defined conceptions of ideal or desirable behaviour is also 
taken up by the literature on new institutionalism. A core 
expectation of this work is that organisations become more 
isomorphic (i.e. similar) over time as they conform to insti-
tutionalised rules, norms and practices (DiMaggio and Pow-
ell 1983). Viewed through the lens of new institutionalism, a 
firm might adjust its CSR-related behaviours in line with the 
criteria enshrined in major ESG ratings because of their per-
ceived, taken-for-granted status as “best” or “appropriate” 
practice (Déjean et al. 2004; Elbasha and Avetisyan 2018). 
Conformity might also result from the coercive requirements 
of powerful organisations which can sanction non-compli-
ance through their control of important resources. One such 
stakeholder group in the present context are investors (Amel-
Zadeh and Serafeim 2018). A further possibility is that firms 
may seek to emulate the ESG policies, practices and scores 
of what are perceived as influential or successful peers—a 
form of mimetic isomorphism potentially underpinned by 
benchmarking activities (Locke 2014; Searcy and Buslovich 
2014; Sharkey and Bromley 2014).
Structuralist variants of institutional theory suggest that 
organisations passively, and even unconsciously, conform 
to institutionalised requirements, beliefs and templates 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008). Yet agent-centred, stra-
tegic approaches point to more active and furthermore 
proactive responses to institutional pressures (Rao 2004). 
Hence, rather than simply adhering to a socially constructed 
environment, it is suggested that actors may purposefully 
exploit institutional demands in order to advance their own 
organisational goals (Suchman 1995). Strategic conformity 
of this kind is identified in a growing body of work in CSR 
concerned with ‘more proactive, value-creating responses 
to institutional pressures’ (Pedersen and Gwozdz 2014, p. 
249). According to this literature, certain firms may seek 
to leverage the benefits of positively engaging with CSR, 
seeking out opportunities by going beyond institutionalised 
expectations (Damert and Baumgartner 2018). Active efforts 
to secure an improved external reputation and organisation-
level differentiation advantage by scoring well on ESG rat-
ings and becoming a sustainability “leader” could be situ-
ated within this frame.
In summary, work on reactivity and isomorphism sug-
gests that firms are likely to conform to ESG ratings, inter-
nalising, adapting to and seeking to improve their scores 
on constituent criteria. As such, the very act of evaluation 
might be expected to transform rated entities, with corpo-
rations becoming more like the template of “good” ESG 
practice institutionalised by SRAs. A further implication is 
that firms’ sustainability performance may improve, notably 
on those dimensions measured, weighted and valorised by 
popular ratings.
Resistance to Ratings
While centrally emphasising conformity, the wider litera-
ture on rankings and ratings nevertheless acknowledges the 
possibility that organisations may resist external evaluations 
(Martins 2005). Past empirical work—albeit mainly in the 
area of educational rankings—has therefore documented a 
range of potential responses which go beyond internalising 
ratings criteria, and adjusting organisational policy, practice 
and performance accordingly. One is to emphasise attributes 
neglected by rankings or to highlight their superior position 
when placed in alternative comparison groups (Elsbach and 
Kramer 1996; Moos 2015). Another response is to dismiss 
ratings, or else criticise their constituent criteria, weights 
or data (Espeland and Sauder 2007; Locke 2014). A further 
reaction is to engage with raters, both to better understand 
their methodology, but also to shape their criteria, weights 
or data sources (Pollock et al. 2018).
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The suggestion that organisations might respond to 
external institutional pressures in ways other than con-
formity is also developed theoretically by Oliver (1991) 
who challenges the deterministic predictions of new 
institutionalism. Beyond acquiescence (i.e. complying 
with, and adjusting to, institutionalised requirements), 
the author proposes four different categories of strategic 
response, capturing increasingly active forms of organisa-
tional resistance: (1) compromise (whereby ‘organisations 
may attempt to balance, pacify, or bargain with external 
constituents’); (2) avoidance (defined as ‘the organisa-
tional attempt to preclude the necessity of conformity’); 
(3) defiance (which involves dismissing, challenging or 
attacking sources of institutional pressure); and (4) manip-
ulation (a ‘purposeful and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, 
influence, or control institutional pressures and evalua-
tions’) (pp. 153–157). Applied in the present setting, such 
insights point towards possible heterogeneity in corporate 
responses to ESG ratings, underpinned by the strategic 
agency of rated entities.
The wider literature identifies several reasons why 
actors might resist, rather than conform to, organisational 
rankings and ratings. Amongst others, resistance may be 
motivated by the negative consequences of unfavourable 
evaluations, both for rated organisations and the people 
working for them (Sauder and Espeland 2009). Addition-
ally, efforts to substantively improve, or even maintain, a 
ranking position or scores may also be costly (Tamimi and 
Sebastianelli 2017). Precisely for this reason, organisa-
tions are liable to “game” rankings and ratings. According 
to Espeland and Sauder (2007, p. 29), ‘[G]aming is about 
managing appearances and involves efforts to improve 
ranking factors without improving the characteristics the 
factors are designed to measure.’ The notion that organisa-
tions attempt to avoid institutional pressures is of special 
interest here because it aligns with the concept of “decou-
pling”, previously invoked in the CSR literature (e.g. 
Egels-Zandén 2007; Testa et al. 2018). This occurs when 
organisations seek to detach their outward-facing, formal 
structures from their everyday internal practices (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977). Through more symbolic and ritualistic 
compliance with external requirements, decoupling allows 
firms to accrue various benefits (enhanced legitimacy, an 
improved reputation, superior access to resources, etc.) 
without making potentially costly substantive changes 
from business-as-usual. Within the present context, corpo-
rations might game ESG ratings through decoupling-type 
behaviour, thereby creating a misleading impression of 
their true performance (Gauthier and Wooldridge 2018). 
In such a scenario, even if a firm’s constituent scores and 
ratings improve, external evaluations will not necessar-
ily contribute to substantive improvements in corporate 
sustainability.
Understanding Heterogeneity
The previous section introduced the possibility that 
responses to ESG ratings might vary. An important question 
concerns the factors which could influence corporations’ 
conformity or resistance to ratings. Returning to an earlier 
theme, and drawing from a body of work within the frame of 
stakeholder theory, one possible determinant is demand from 
stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston 1995). Managers will 
often have to prioritise some stakeholder claims over oth-
ers (Mitchell et al. 1997). From the perspective of resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), influential 
stakeholders will be those with ownership or control over 
resources which are critical for organisational success. It fol-
lows that if firms perceive that powerful stakeholders value 
the attributes measured by ESG ratings, they are more likely 
to ‘conform and perform’ (Gioia and Corley 2002, p. 110) 
according to their criteria. Conversely, where firms face lim-
ited pressure from influential stakeholders over their ratings’ 
performance, they may have more latitude to resist. Adopt-
ing a similar logic, corporate responses might vary across 
sectors. Firms in industries involving greater environmental 
or social impacts may experience higher stakeholder expec-
tations and demands to actively and positively adjust to the 
requirements of ESG ratings (Hahn and Kühnen 2013).
Another set of factors which could influence responses 
are managerial values, attitudes and beliefs which, individu-
ally or in combination, shape an organisation’s orientations 
towards external evaluations and the constituent attributes 
they measure. Taking a cue from Baumgartner (2013) and 
Dowling and Moran (2012), a firm’s orientation toward 
ESG-type issues is likely to be underpinned by normative 
logics, which guide managers’ understanding of an organi-
sation’s identity, purpose and ethical responsibilities. It is 
also likely to be shaped by economic and strategic logics, 
encapsulating organisational goals, and managerial beliefs 
about how best to achieve these strategically (Banerjee 2001; 
Malik 2015). Differences in managerial values and beliefs 
may result in what Ullmann (1985) describes as a passive or 
active ‘strategic posture’. An active posture would suggest 
a firm conforming to ESG ratings, underpinned by positive 
managerial attitudes toward their value-enhancing possibili-
ties or alignment with ethical principles. Conversely, manag-
ers may see little or no value in monitoring or responding 
to ESG ratings as part of their wider competitive or CSR 
strategy. In this situation, a passive strategic posture is more 
likely, possibly resulting in resistance-type behaviours (Ali 
et al. 2017).
Resources may also influence corporate responses. 
Organisations with more resources will be better placed 
to measure, collect and report on data used by rating 
agencies (Slager et al. 2012). They will also be able to 
invest more in changes to policy, practice and performance 
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attributes measured by SRAs. Within the literature, the 
greater availability of “slack resources” has been used to 
explain why larger firms engage in more CSR practices 
(Campbell 2007), and disclose more ESG-related infor-
mation (Tamimi and Sebastianelli 2017; Drempetic et al. 
2019). As such, it is plausible to suggest that conform-
ity to ESG ratings may be underpinned by superior cor-
porate resources, and resistance a product of inadequate 
resources. Time is a further potentially relevant variable. 
As highlighted in Espeland and Sauder’s (2007) work, ini-
tial dismissal of ratings can give way to greater strategic 
engagement, as rated entities acknowledge their impor-
tance and develop more sophisticated ways of respond-
ing. Likewise, Moos (2015) suggests that the cognitive 
legitimacy of ratings schemes may increase over time as 
they become more institutionalised, reducing the degree of 
discretion over how rated entities respond. Similar obser-
vations have been made in the wider literature on CSR 
which has recognised how stakeholder expectations of 
appropriate behaviour may change over time (e.g. Altura 
et al. forthcoming) and how firms may adjust CSR prac-
tice through learning and adaptation (e.g. Egels-Zandén 
2014). What this suggests is that firms may move from an 
initial position of resistance to one of conformity. Finally, 
referencing previous quantitative work on ESG ratings, a 
firm’s current ESG score might be expected to shape its 
response. The underlying idea is that poor ratings attract 
negative attention from external stakeholders, who exert 
pressure on corporations to improve their performance. 
Internally, too, firms may take measures to conform to rat-
ings, aware of the potentially damaging consequences of a 
low score (Chatterji and Toffel 2010; Slager and Chapple 
2016). Active responses aimed at positively adjusting to 
ratings and improving ESG evaluations might therefore be 
greater for corporations with relatively poor scores and/
or overall rank.
Research Design and Methods
Departing from the quantitative approach characterising 
most previous empirical work on ESG ratings, this paper 
adopts a qualitative research strategy. A particular advantage 
of this approach in the present context is that it is well suited 
to deriving—potentially new—categories from the data, and 
therefore identifying and characterising corporate responses 
(Mikko and Choi 2014). A qualitative, case study approach 
also provides in-depth, contextualised insights which can 
provide a richer account of human and organisational behav-
iour (Crouch and McKenzie 2006; Bryman 2016). As such, 
it can help unearth the context, processes and influences 
shaping corporate decision-making in the area of ESG rat-
ings from the perspective of those being studied (i.e. indi-
viduals working for firms with a remit for ESG).
The empirical setting for our research is Italy. In focus-
ing on a single country, we sought to remove cross-national 
sources of variability which might otherwise complicate 
the analysis. Italy is considered a relevant case because a 
non-trivial number of predominantly larger, publicly listed 
and/or multinational companies operating in the country 
have been subject to ESG ratings (Cucari et al. 2018). A 
summary of the main SRAs in Italy is provided in Table 1. 
Another reason for studying ESG ratings in this setting is 
that there is empirical evidence that firms in the country are 
increasingly responsive to CSR issues (Ormazabal and Sar-
riegi 2014). Amongst others, a growing number of large cor-
porates are adopting sustainability reporting and assurance 
practices, and moreover across a wide range of ESG-related 
issues (Larrinaga et al. 2018; Romolini et al. 2014). At the 
same time, there is evidence of considerable inter-firm vari-
ability in CSR approaches and practices (e.g. Perrini et al. 
2007; D’Amico et al. 2016), suggesting that Italy might be 
an appropriate setting in which to investigate whether firms 
respond differently to ESG ratings.
Table 1  Summary information on sustainability rating agencies (SRAs) operating in Italy
Source Authors, based on company websites
a Consolidated summary of services related to ESG only
SRA Headquarters Servicesa
MSCI USA ESG ratings, sustainability services, ESG/low carbon indices (e.g. MSCI Climate Change Indexes)
Vigeo-Eiris France ESG ratings, CSR analysis, sustainability indices (e.g. Ethibel Sustainability Indices)
ISS Germany ESG ratings, sustainability and governance analysis and services, proxy voting, engagement services, ESG/low 
carbon indices (e.g. Solactive ISS ESG Screened Index Series)
ECPI Italy ESG ratings, sustainability services, ESG indices (e.g. ECPI Equity Index)
Sustainalytics Netherlands ESG (and associated) ratings, sustainability and governance analysis and services, engagement services, sustain-
ability indices (e.g. Global Sustainability Leaders Index)
Refinitiv UK and USA ESG data, ESG/low carbon indices (e.g. Thomson Reuters/S-Network ESG Best Practice Indices)
RobecoSAM Switzerland ESG ratings, asset management, sustainability analysis and services, ESG/sustainability/low carbon indices (e.g. 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index Series)
FTSE Russell UK ESG ratings, data analysis and services, sustainability/low carbon indices (e.g. FTSE4Good Index Series)
How Do Companies Respond to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) ratings?
1 3
Several distinctive features of Italian CSR are docu-
mented in the literature. One is an important role for the 
state in supporting various public CSR initiatives at the 
national and regional level. Another distinctive feature is 
a strong emphasis on addressing the needs of employees 
and local communities (Del Baldo et al. 2015; Perrini et al. 
2007). The Italian business system is sometimes character-
ised as exhibiting an “implicit approach” to CSR wherein 
firms are primarily responsive to institutional (i.e. wider 
stakeholder) expectations. Yet, compared to Germany and 
the US, Habisch et al. (2011) find evidence that the level of 
involvement by investors in stakeholder dialogues is rela-
tively high in Italy. The present paper provides an opportu-
nity to examine whether these stylised features of the Italian 
system are manifest in the way firms react to ESG ratings.
In-depth, semi-structured interviews were undertaken 
with heads or managers of sustainability/CSR departments 
of companies operating in Italy. In order to identify the 
relevant population, websites of SRAs were consulted to 
locate companies which had been rated, or included in a 
relevant index. For the purposes of the study, we included 
well-known ESG rating agencies such as MSCI, Sustainalyt-
ics and Vigeo-Eiris, which also produce ESG, sustainabil-
ity and/or low carbon indices. We also included the CDP 
(formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project) which, 
while a non-profit exclusively focused on environment-
related aspects, is nevertheless an important actor engaged 
in performance evaluation. Information about companies’ 
ESG ratings and their inclusion in indices was also collected 
through firms’ websites and reports. Approximately 300 
firms were found listed on various rating agencies’ web-
sites. From these, we selected companies rated by the largest 
number of SRAs and/or featured in one or more sustain-
ability index. This resulted in a preliminary sample of 57 
companies, which were subsequently contacted. Twenty-five 
replied and consented to be interviewed. Particular attention 
was paid to ensuring respondents were well placed to pro-
vide information about firms’ responses to ESG ratings. In 
seven cases this person was not available. Interviews were 
thus carried out with 18 individuals representing a diver-
sity of sectors (see Table 2). Six interviews were conducted 
in person, while the others were carried out over the tel-
ephone. Interviews were conducted during April-July 2018 
and lasted between 35–70 min. All the interviews were 
undertaken in Italian and transcribed verbatim. Quotes pre-
sented in the paper were translated into English by one of 
the authors. Interviews were complemented by data from 
sustainability/integrated reports for companies in the sample 
which, amongst others, were used to better contextualise, 
interpret and verify statements made by respondents.
Thematic analysis was used to analyse the transcribed 
text. In the first stage, codes were developed which were 
felt to be relevant for our research questions (concerning the 
how, why and substantive impact of firms’ responses to ESG 
ratings). Subsequently, organising themes and sub-themes 
were created, wherein a theme ‘captures something impor-
tant about the data…and represents some level of patterned 
response or meaning within the data set’ (Braun and Clarke 
2006, p. 82). This second stage involved collapsing relevant 
codes into coherent categories, examining their frequency 
and identifying common and divergent themes across the 
cases. It also involved a degree of abduction in that pre-
existing concepts were drawn on to inform the development, 
framing and subsequent interpretation of several thematic 
categories (Klag and Langley 2013). To take one example: 
the descriptors of ‘active’ and ‘passive’, previously invoked 
in the literature on organisational responses to institutional 
and stakeholder pressures, were enrolled because they 
offered a good ‘situational fit’ (Timmermans and Tavory 
2012, p. 171) with the data.
Through the analysis, we developed a typology of 
responses to ESG ratings, together with an accompanying set 
of themes capturing mechanisms, influences and rationales. 
At the broadest level, we identified companies’ responses 
as falling into two categories, resistance and conformity. 
We further found these types of response operated across 
two dimensions: (a) compliance with criteria established by 
SRAs, in terms of corresponding adjustments to organisa-
tional policies, processes and practices; and (b) interactions 
and engagement between companies and rating agencies. 
Our next step was to map out the responses of individual 
companies across these dimensions. To do so, each of the 
eighteen sample companies was assigned a score on a Likert 
Table 2  Sectoral composition of the sample
Company # Company sector
1 Financial
2 Utility (energy)
3 High-tech industry
4 Utility (energy)
5 Mechanical engineering
6 Financial
7 Utility (energy)
8 Manufacturing
9 Multi-utility
10 Utility (energy)
11 Financial
12 Multi-utility
13 Utility (energy)
14 Utility (energy)
15 Utility (energy)
16 Utility (energy)
17 Services
18 Services
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scale from − 3 to + 3 on their degree of resistance/conform-
ity for (a) and (b) above, yielding a fourfold typology (see 
Appendix 1).
Results and Analysis
We begin by briefly describing our fourfold typology. This 
is followed by a more detailed analysis of firm responses 
within these categories, together with associated mecha-
nisms and rationales.
Responses to ESG Ratings
Our findings provide evidence of considerable heteroge-
neity in how firms respond to ESG ratings (Fig. 1). Firms 
adjusting to ratings, albeit largely by changing aspects of 
their external disclosure and reporting practices to meet the 
informational needs of SRAs, lie in the passive conformity 
quadrant. Another set of companies which internalise ratings 
are located in the active conformity quadrant. Their common 
denominator is that they actively respond to ESG ratings, 
seeking to improve their scores through external reporting, 
but also through internal changes in CSR-related organi-
sational processes and/or practices. The passive resistance 
quadrant contains companies resisting ratings by largely 
choosing to ignore them outright, while those in the active 
resistance quadrant seek to minimise the impact of ratings. 
Active conformity (N = 8) is the most common response, 
with just under half of the sample in this category. The other 
categorical responses each represent a broadly similar num-
ber of firms (N = 3–4).
Passive Conformity
Respondents categorised in this group affirmed that their 
company reacted, at least to some degree, to being evalu-
ated and that ESG ratings were a real driver of change. Yet 
they largely responded in ways centred on communication 
and reporting. Most identified sustainability reports as the 
principal instrument to satisfy raters’ information requests. 
The main mechanism triggered was improved disclosure to 
conform to the requirements of rating agencies. Three inter-
viewees observed that the majority of SRAs looked mostly at 
documents published online. This inspired their companies 
to disclose more information—expanding sections and add-
ing new ones on their websites and/or sustainability reports. 
As described by one interviewee:
We have seen this proliferation of assessments and 
we can’t keep up with these requests…But at least we 
try to see what they [SRAs] are asking for from one 
year to the next and to adjust our sustainability report 
accordingly. If you look at our website, some things 
were not communicated before, we did not even think 
about communicating them.
The potential to attract investors was the primary motivat-
ing factor to better meet the information requirements of 
SRAs, including compiling questionnaires they received, 
and reviewing profile reports when “inaccuracies or incom-
plete information were evident”. That many of their direct 
competitors were present in these ratings was also frequently 
cited as an incentive to complete surveys. One interviewee 
stated that: “If we were the only one in our sector to be 
rated, we would probably ignore them.” Another reported 
that his company hired external consultants because it could 
Fig. 1  Typology of company 
responses to ESG ratings. 
Source Authors, based on inter-
view responses
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not afford “two people working full time for a few months on 
these tasks.” In this case, while reluctantly acknowledging 
the need to be responsive to information requirements, a lack 
of resources meant that the company was constrained in the 
degree to which it could optimise its scores:
We found ourselves fighting on the same field with 
companies which are giants compared to us. They 
[SRAs] compare us with [name of a competitor] 
because we are in the same sector. They use the same 
characteristics for analysis, but it is clear that we can-
not have the same number of people for reporting, the 
same resources, etc.…so we try to answer them any-
way, but we do not have time to investigate the why 
and the how of a certain score.
Active Conformity
Companies grouped in this category placed a strong empha-
sis on reputational value to explain the time and resources 
they dedicated to responding to raters’ requests and to the 
analysis of results. The logic was that enhancing their scores 
would attract more investors. Six interviewees recognised 
the power of ratings in commensurating (Espeland and Ste-
vens 1998) several aspects of CSR-related performance into 
a single score, providing a signal to the market and enabling 
investors to compare different companies. The term “flag” 
was used by three respondents to talk about ratings as being 
symbolic of their sustainability leadership. As stated by a 
head of CSR:
We use ratings to establish credibility with investors…
If you want to be a leader in CSR and attract investors, 
what does this mean? Above all, the external recogni-
tion that is given by the inclusion in the indices, which 
is a flag…
Companies underlined that over time they had learnt which 
ratings are considered more reliable by investors and which 
are more important for them in reputational terms. However, 
two companies made the point that investors are likely to 
purchase ESG data from diverse providers and make use of 
multiple ratings before considering an investment. For this 
reason, they considered it appropriate “to keep an eye on 
all the ratings,” while paying particular attention to those 
regarded as the “most strategic”. Such behaviour chimes 
with Pollock et al.’s (2018) concept of “tiering”, whereby 
organisations sort and prioritise rankings/ratings according 
to their perceived significance. Two interviewees recog-
nised that their companies started by adopting a more pas-
sive strategy at the beginning, becoming more active over 
time as they gained the knowledge “to build up an adequate 
response that actually complies with the agencies’ requests.”
All respondents in this category made explicit their 
interest in engaging with SRAs where possible. They com-
monly acknowledged the added value of direct contact with 
agencies:
A greater level of dialogue helps us to get more infor-
mation regarding the methodologies they [SRAs] use. 
Since the involvement from our side is maximum, we 
appreciate when we can ask for further clarification 
after receiving the assessment/rating.
In the compilation phase of the questionnaires, the most 
common kind of engagement was participation in work-
shops, organised by some agencies to provide support with 
ESG reporting.
Companies in this category reported that ESG ratings had 
activated several mechanisms: enhanced reporting, internal 
organisational change, setting incentives, raised awareness, 
learning, benchmarking and policy implementation.
Enhanced Reporting All companies indicated that they 
dedicated more resources over the years to the produc-
tion of an integrated report. Three noted that the complex-
ity of reporting standards led them to include people with 
more technical expertise in their sustainability teams, such 
as engineers and physicists. They also recognised that the 
outcome of this process was a series of structured reports, 
which were “hardly understandable for the general public” 
and principally aimed at investors.
Internal Organisational Change Companies reported that 
their sustainability/CSR unit was composed of two or three 
people responsible for dealing with ratings and interacting 
with the agencies. However, they underlined that crafting 
responses to the questionnaires and analysing the results had 
become cross-disciplinary activities, and this allowed for 
collaboration between offices. All of them stated that they 
work closely with their colleagues from the investor rela-
tions team but also involve other departments (such as risk 
management or human resources) on ESG issues and create 
working groups across the company to further investigate 
poorly rated areas. One interviewee recognised the benefits 
of responding to SRA requests:
Look at the Dow Jones, which covers so many issues, 
providing specific and clear definitions of the sub-
jects…It truly facilitates the activation of new pro-
cesses of self-governance…We manage to engage 
other units and this spurs conversation around what 
can we do better.
As a result of increased internal engagement, interviewees 
stated that ESG ratings played a role in offering external 
legitimation of the function of the sustainability team itself. 
Indeed, they provided a lever for justifying sustainability 
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requests across other offices and driving change. As one 
interviewee noted:
One thing is going to my colleagues saying: ‘It would 
be great if we do something to reduce our emissions…
and they say: yes, sure, I am going to make this my pri-
ority number 150.’ But if instead, you go with requests 
coming from outside, which are backed by investors, 
well then…you are a bit more likely to create change.
Setting Incentives Four interviewees stated that their com-
panies set an explicit goal of being included in sustainability 
indices. Specifically, they explained that their operational 
and senior managers, the executive team, and the Chief 
Executive Officer had personal performance objectives 
linked to the achievement of good scores in the DJSI, FTSE-
4Good, Vigeo-Eiris and CDP. However, one interviewee 
underlined that this attention to their ratings and the “direct 
impact they have on people’s wallets” sometimes resulted in 
causing a distorting effect, insofar as “it obliged to introduce 
practices that aren’t relevant to the company’s core business, 
just to be compliant with them [SRA requests].”
Awareness ESG ratings were considered useful in detecting 
emerging issues related to ESG and to “keep track of the 
best practices and stay informed about the state-of-the-art.” 
One interviewee defined ESG ratings as “translators of the 
international expectations concerning sustainability in busi-
nesses.” Similarly, others framed ratings as “interpreters” 
and “proxies of stakeholder interests.” As a consequence, 
participants recognised that ESG ratings made a decisive 
contribution to shifting the focus towards issues which were 
previously ignored. Another interviewee suggested that, as 
a result of this increased awareness, the company had acti-
vated new practices:
We first saw the booming interest in the topic of cli-
mate change, and subsequently the increasing impor-
tance of the theme of water. In both cases, the compa-
ny’s involvement in these topics was partial or, even in 
the case of water, non-existent. The ratings allowed us 
to understand the size of the problem, the reasons and 
the interest, and as such, we decided to initiate some 
management processes within the company.
Learning A mechanism commonly identified by compa-
nies was to look at the indicators that ratings underlined 
as needing improvement and striving to become better 
informed of best practices. Most of them stated that such 
analysis and learning were carried out internally, without 
using consultants. However, in some cases, they allocated 
specific resources to investigate certain areas that were 
poorly rated with RobecoSAM’s Sustainability Services 
team. They also attended the workshops organised by the 
CDP to “keep up with their methodologies.” Potential 
forms of perverse learning (Meyer and Gupta 1994) were 
identified, with companies intent on finding out how to 
improve their outcome in performance measures, rather 
than their substantive sustainability performance. In fact, 
two interviewees said they were aware of commensura-
tion ambiguities that could be strategically exploited. For 
instance, they admitted to hiring external consultants, not 
to better understand which sustainability strategies could 
be pursued, but only to acquire more insight on SRAs’ 
scoring methodology. In the words of one participant:
Since everything depends on how they score your 
responses – for each question you can get one, two 
or half a point – we ask consultants to support us…
They study the whole scoring methodology every 
year, so they know it inside out and suggest how to 
properly respond.
The tactic of gaining a better understanding of evaluation 
methodologies to improve scores has been documented 
in previous work on organisational ratings (Szper 2013).
Benchmarking Interviewees explained that they use rat-
ings as a tool in the benchmarking of performance with 
other companies. Six companies indicated that they usu-
ally examine the areas where they score poorly compared 
to their peers and engage with the agencies to identify key 
areas for improvement. Four interviewees stated that they 
looked at what their competitors were doing in order to 
understand the critical aspects they had to implement in 
their strategy. One interviewee stated that in some cases 
the transparency of raters in disclosing information facili-
tated this benchmarking analysis. They gave the example 
of CDP questionnaires:
There was this question on emission reduction initia-
tives…We noticed that while we were able to complete 
only a single line of all the required information, other 
companies had provided ten lines of information…So 
I went to the persons responsible for the functions 
involved saying: ‘It’s fine that we treat information 
sensitively but look at what our competitors are dis-
closing…That’s what we need to not to be outdone’.
Implementing New Policies To improve their scores, and 
as a result of enhanced awareness, learning and bench-
marking analysis, companies claimed to have defined 
and activated new policies in several areas. When asked 
to provide examples, they cited those related to climate 
change, diversity and taxes. Three interviewees argued 
that their companies would not have introduced a human 
rights policy in their annual report if there had not been an 
explicit request by the agencies to do so.
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While companies in the active conformity category were 
responsive, several respondents nevertheless voiced frustra-
tion with ESG ratings. Two of them, for example, expressed 
annoyance about the difficulties and costs encountered in 
finding out more about their scores. As one remarked:
Last year, we did not understand which criteria they 
[a specific SRA] used: it just didn’t add up. And when 
we asked for clarification, they redirected us to their 
commercial office…So in that case, you are forced to 
pay if you need some background information to use it 
as a tool to improve your score in the future.
Passive Resistance
When companies were not able to see any economic gains in 
terms of attracting investments or social benefits in terms of 
enhanced reputation, annoyance in receiving various SRA 
requests was expressed. They indicated no will to respond 
or initiate a dialogue with the agencies. They also claimed 
to disregard ESG ratings when taking strategic decisions 
within the company as they perceived no value added from 
the assessments or in some cases a clash between their pri-
orities and the raters’ criteria. Few, if any, adjustments to 
organisational policy, process and/or practice were made.
Ignoring The principal rationale here was that the costs of 
responding to SRAs and considering ESG ratings were not 
worth the effort. The assignment of poor scores was thus 
passively acknowledged and explained by the recognition 
of a divergence between the company’s priorities and rat-
ings’ criteria. According to one interviewee, investments 
made to improve ESG scores run the risk of being entirely 
futile or “resulting in nothing more than façade operations 
detached from corporate culture.” In this view, meeting 
raters’ demands would interfere with business strategy. As 
stated by one interviewee:
Rating agencies keep on scoring us poorly because we 
do not encourage the diffusion of [redacted to protect 
company’s anonymity]. But the point is that it would 
not be consistent with our industrial logic. Should I do 
it because raters asked me to? I don’t think so, that’s 
not useful for improving our positioning, so we just 
ignore them.
Active Resistance
Four companies reported that, since they did not see the 
changes being demanded by the agencies as consistent with 
their business goals, ESG ratings were rarely considered. 
However, they showed a certain level of engagement with 
the agencies to manifest their scepticism, or to influence 
their scoring methodologies.
Deflection These companies’ resistant behaviour was 
motivated by a desire to channel resources towards direct 
engagement with investors while trying to minimise the 
impact of raters’ requests. The main shortcoming of ESG 
ratings was attributed to the fact that “rating agencies rely 
too heavily on past performance and they are of limited use 
in predicting future performance, which is the objective of 
every investor.” Two interviewees noted that many investors 
now have in-house ESG teams and their own ESG dash-
boards. Therefore, these companies prioritise the prepara-
tion of tailored information, focusing on particular topics in 
response to specific investor queries:
You have to establish a relationship of trust with your 
investors, and that requires time. But we have seen 
that one-on-one meetings are just much more profit-
able…Those who really want to invest in us need more 
detailed data on our company’s ESG performance and, 
in any event, they will go beyond ESG ratings.
Lobbying In two cases, companies reported a sentiment of 
frustration at seeing how they were rated on issues deemed 
unrelated to their business, and in some cases considered 
irrelevant to their sustainability performance. This led 
them to adopt a strategy aimed at influencing the SRAs 
with regards to the methodologies used. One interviewee 
reported his wish to be assessed on the most material issues 
and said that the work of convincing the agencies had occa-
sionally led to changes in the criteria on which they were 
evaluated:
We have spent years trying to persuade raters that bio-
diversity is a much more important issue to address 
than water consumption…of course we know it’s 
important, but we just cannot do that much due to our 
structures. CDP and RobecoSAM eventually accepted 
our plea, giving less weight to that section, and taking 
our suggestions into account for their methodological 
reviews.
Another company stated that, in order to increase their 
chances of having an impact on the agencies, they some-
times looked for alliances with other companies—based in 
other European countries—which they knew were facing 
the same problems.
Impact on ESG Performance
When asked about the impact of ESG ratings on corpo-
rate sustainability performance, the majority of respond-
ents denied any valuable contribution. Only those whose 
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companies were actively conforming to rating agencies’ 
criteria claimed to have defined and activated new poli-
cies in certain areas, e.g. human rights, diversity and gov-
ernance issues. Three respondents explicitly recognised 
that the logic behind the formulation of these initiatives 
was mainly in order to achieve better scores, rather than a 
conscious strategy aimed at improving substantive perfor-
mance. In the words of one sustainability manager:
We have never considered creating a policy on 
human rights. We only operate in Italy and we do not 
operate in the tomato supply chain – for us, that was 
not a sensitive issue. We decided to do it just to be 
compliant with rater requests. But that doesn’t have 
any impact on our strategy. We have made a policy, 
but for us, it was just about gathering the information 
and presenting it in the right way.
In those cases where companies acknowledged that 
their ESG performance indicators had seen a significant 
improvement over the years, they attributed this progress 
to several factors. Amongst the most frequently cited were 
senior management’s commitment to sustainability and the 
recognition that ESG best practices are the key to suc-
cessful business strategies in the medium-to-long term. 
One interviewee explained that her company’s ESG rat-
ings “validate some of our practices primarily adopted for 
mitigating risk and strengthening the company’s positive 
reputation.” However, she could not see it the other way 
around, whereby the company had developed actions to 
enhance its ESG scores. Similarly, another interviewee 
described how, at most, SRA requests could be regarded 
as a “stimulus and pressure” to enhance awareness, but 
not as a direct cause of their performance improvements:
[Rating agency requests] might have indirectly 
spurred us to set some targets to reduce water con-
sumption or focus on energy-saving solutions but I 
think this would have been the path anyway, no mat-
ter what…For us, these [environmentally sustainable 
practices] are crucial parts of our business, and our 
CEO believes in it thoroughly.
Two interviewees stressed that, although they play a role in 
raising internal awareness and promoting enhanced disclo-
sure in the early phase of their companies’ sustainability 
efforts, the impact of ESG ratings had diminished as they 
went forward. This is because SRAs were no longer able to 
take account of issues that were more financially material 
to the company. They stressed that decision-making pro-
cesses were not significantly affected by the consideration 
of ESG ratings unless they were coupled with a special 
attention within the company or by more stringent regula-
tory pressures from outside.
When neither an endorsement from the executive level 
nor public pressure or other external incentives were regis-
tered, the potential of ESG ratings to lead to the adoption 
of better CSR practices was rarely acknowledged and inter-
viewees were not able to offer compelling examples. They 
commonly noted that the definition of their corporate strat-
egy—regarding any aspect, including ESG—is essentially 
an internal process. Two companies stressed that they had 
the “implicit obligation” to consider all the stakeholders in 
the formulation of the materiality matrix and strategy, and 
rating agencies were just one of these stakeholders. Another 
participant recognised that changes in the corporate culture 
require a much more compelling and pervasive stimulus than 
a rating “issued once a year and based on an analysis of 
publicly available sources.”
The influence of ESG ratings was thus seen as more evi-
dent in driving corporate action on social and environmen-
tal reporting. All the companies interviewed, except those 
adopting a passive resistance approach, witnessed a consoli-
dation of their internal data collection processes to respond 
to SRA questionnaires and evaluations. However, three 
interviewees stated that responding to ESG ratings mainly 
served the role of systematising what was already taking 
place within the company without affecting their internal 
strategies in any way. Furthermore, respondents suggested 
that ratings were only one of the factors influencing sus-
tainability reporting, others including voluntary standards 
(such as the GRI and the UN Global Compact Principles) 
and regulatory requirements (such as the EU Directive on 
Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity Information).
Discussion
Our findings make four important contributions to current 
understanding. First, echoing previous work on organi-
sational rankings (Espeland and Sauder 2007; Scott and 
Orlikowski 2012; Szper 2013), we show that a significant 
number of companies (but not all) were reactive to ESG 
ratings. The very act of being rated did alter firm behaviour 
in ways which can be interpreted as conformity to criteria 
enshrined in the respective ratings. By far the most com-
mon response was disclosure, i.e. firms sought to make 
additional information available on attributes upon which 
they are evaluated or disclosed in a format which was bet-
ter suited to the metrics used by SRAs. Fewer companies 
adjusted by changing their actual CSR policies, practices 
and/or performances. One possible explanation for this find-
ing is the methodology used to compile ESG scores. Com-
panies’ ratings are, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced 
by the data available to SRAs such that firms can improve 
their scores on certain attributes simply by disclosing more 
or better quality information (Doyle 2018; Drempetic et al. 
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2019). Enhancing disclosures is also far less costly, time 
consuming and disruptive than making substantive changes 
in ESG-related organisational practices.
The observation that firms had predominantly sought 
to conform to ratings through changes to disclosures is 
important because it points to the possibility of gaming 
(Espeland and Sauder 2007). Indeed, while some compa-
nies had accompanied improved disclosures with substan-
tive changes in CSR-related policy and practice, for others 
this was decoupled from the reality of their sustainability 
performance. In common with similar forms of externally 
imposed organisational evaluations (e.g. Graf et al. 2019), 
we therefore show that ESG ratings may lead organisations 
to gaming-type behaviour.
A second contribution of our study is to identify a broader 
set of corporate responses to ESG ratings than previously 
documented in the literature. Conformity may well have 
been the dominant response amongst the firms in the sam-
ple. Yet, advancing on past work, we show that conform-
ity took different forms and, moreover, was not the only 
response. Of note, certain firms resisted ESG ratings, a find-
ing which provides a corrective to accounts which largely 
emphasise the homogenising effect of organisational evalu-
ations (Chelli and Gendron 2013; Jabłecka 2012; Sauder and 
Espeland 2009). By exposing diversity, this paper confirms 
the predictions of Oliver (1991), who suggests that insti-
tutional pressures may give rise to heterogeneous organi-
sational responses. Our typology of corporate responses 
overlaps with, but does not identically replicate, Oliver’s. 
The passive conformity approach combines elements of 
acquiescence and compromise, with firms acceding to insti-
tutional demands but balancing these against other require-
ments. Passive resistance maps onto a strategy of defiance 
and, more specifically, the tactic of ‘dismissing’ whereby 
organisations ignore institutional requirements, while active 
resistance resembles Oliver’s manipulation strategy which 
involves efforts to ‘actively change or exert power over the 
content of the expectations themselves or the sources that 
seek to express or enforce them` (ibid, p. 157). However, 
resonating with Pedersen’s and Gwozdz’s (2014) observa-
tions about the possibilities of strategic CSR, we also find 
evidence for responses which go beyond Oliver’s typology. 
More specifically, the active conformity category captures 
several responses which are constitutive of an opportunity-
seeking approach, wherein firms seek to score well (“com-
pete”) on ESG metrics in order to gain competitive advan-
tage. Corporate responses to ESG ratings are therefore not 
unlike other areas of CSR—with a sub-set of firms adopt-
ing a more proactive, value-seeking approach (Damert and 
Baumgartner 2018; Lee 2011).
A third important contribution is to provide novel 
insights into the under-researched question of why organ-
isations respond differently to being evaluated (Rindova 
et al. 2018). One factor which stands out in explaining 
variability along the conformity/resistance axis was 
the degree to which companies believed that positively 
adjusting to ESG ratings provided business benefits. This 
involved two dimensions. One centred on external stake-
holders: where better ESG scores or inclusion in indices 
was believed to help companies improve their reputation 
amongst investors, they were more likely to conform to the 
requirements and criteria of SRAs. Although this result 
is broadly consistent with stakeholder theory (Donaldson 
and Preston 1995), it is worth remembering that inves-
tors comprise primary stakeholders, rather than secondary 
ones. As such, our findings are aligned with a more con-
ventional shareholder view of the firm (Flammer 2013), 
and confirm Habisch et  al.’s (2011) finding about the 
relative significance of investors as stakeholders in Italy. 
Indeed, we found evidence that responses to specific ESG 
ratings partly depended on firms’ perceptions regarding 
their standing, and whether investors would look at them. 
While companies recognised some SRAs as well-estab-
lished players, they expressed uncertainty in how to deal 
with newcomers, whose relevant audience is unclear. Our 
findings therefore lend weight to Moos’s (2015) obser-
vation that ratings must pass a “legitimacy threshold” in 
order to gain authority with rated parties, with firms more 
responsive to what were seen to be more legitimate SRAs.
A further dimension shaping firms’ response to ESG 
ratings centred on the degree to which they were aligned 
with corporate strategy. Companies were more likely to 
exhibit a positive strategic posture (Ullmann 1985) toward 
ratings where managers believed that internalising ratings, 
enhancing relevant disclosures or making associated inter-
nal changes contributed to wider business strategy and 
objectives. Conversely, where managers felt that ESG 
ratings contributed little or nothing to corporate goals, 
companies were far more likely to ignore, dismiss or chal-
lenge them. The issue of materiality was mentioned sev-
eral times throughout the interviews and resistance-type 
behaviours were mainly motivated by the perception that 
agencies’ priorities were not well aligned with the peculi-
arities of an individual firm’s business.
Closely associated with resistance was frustration. The 
multiplicity of requests drew strong criticism, with com-
panies reporting having to deal with as many as thirty 
SRAs. This has led to a “reporting fatigue”, together with 
a degree of resentment and cynicism towards raters and 
their motives. As one interviewee noted:
They [SRAs] are measuring similar things in differ-
ent ways, with different platforms at the same time 
of the year; it has become a proper growing business, 
with ESG data providers that compete with each 
other and offer fee-based advisory services.
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Respondents also complained about how they felt judged 
on externally defined elements over which they had no con-
trol and/or of limited relevance to evaluating ESG-related 
risks, opportunities or performance. This raises an impor-
tant point: resistance should not simply be interpreted as a 
strategy by firms to avoid ethical behaviour. It can moreover 
be driven by perceptions that ratings are too costly, time 
consuming and do not always contribute to enhancing firms’ 
substantive contribution to sustainability.
A lack of internal resources was cited by a handful of 
respondents as inhibiting conformity to informational 
requests from SRAs. Such a finding is consistent with pre-
vious work on CSR-related disclosures (Chiu and Wang 
2015). Yet the influence of ESG scores did not emerge as a 
significant factor. Respondents rarely mentioned their exist-
ing scores as a salient factor influencing their conformity 
or resistance. Two other factors previously invoked in the 
literature similarly did not appear to be important. We could 
discern no clear relationship between firms’ sector and their 
response: companies belonging to the same sector (e.g. utili-
ties) responded in different ways. The impact of time was 
also ambiguous: over time, active conformity grew amongst 
certain firms, while others became more resistant.
A further contribution is to provide insights into who gov-
erns through ESG ratings. As evidenced by their salience, 
investors emerged as an important set of actors, a finding 
which corroborates evidence about the growing incidence 
of ESG integration, investment and engagement (Cappucci 
2018). Yet our paper additionally draws attention to the 
role of rated firms themselves who may use ESG ratings to 
self-govern their performance. In common with Searcy and 
Elkhawas (2012), we found evidence that ratings were used 
for benchmarking purposes, i.e. comparing own company 
scores against their peers. The growing application of bench-
marking has been documented in the wider CSR literature 
(Provasnek et al. 2017). The findings here foreground the 
role of ESG ratings in these reflexive processes, and high-
light the role of benchmarking as a mechanism of mimetic 
isomorphism (Parast and Adams 2012).
Conclusions
Our paper paints a more complex, differentiated picture of 
companies’ responses to ESG ratings than portrayed in the 
existing literature. We show that there is no single response 
to ESG ratings, just as there is no single way in which 
firms respond more generally to CSR pressures (Dupire 
and M’Zali 2018). Instead, firms may react differently to 
being rated, captured by our fourfold typology of responses. 
The typology identifies conformity or resistance to ratings 
across two dimensions: (a) the degree to which companies 
adjust their policies, processes and practices to comply with 
ratings; and (b) the degree to which companies engage with 
ratings and SRAs. The empirical results suggest that the 
heterogeneity of responses was largely shaped by managers’ 
perceptions of the instrumental “business value” of internal-
ising and adjusting to ESG ratings.
The present paper is not without its limitations. Our sam-
ple is drawn from a single country with specific character-
istics and is comparatively small. The empirical findings 
may be subject to selection bias since individuals with cer-
tain beliefs might have been more willing to participate in 
the research. Additionally, with just under half of the firms 
deriving from the utility sector, our sample is not repre-
sentative of the overall population of rated companies. It 
is also possible that respondents may have provided biased 
answers to questions, for example, in the degree to which 
ESG ratings were a true driver of CSR (King et al. 2018). 
Indeed, even though interviewees provided what appeared to 
be candid answers, it was not often possible to corroborate 
their responses.
We nevertheless believe that our paper’s findings have 
wider implications. One is for the study of corporate 
responses to organisational ratings and other performance 
measures (Rindova et al. 2018; Sroufe 2017). Our results 
bring into focus the value of exploring the potentially diverse 
sets of ways in which rated entities react to external sus-
tainability- and ethics-related evaluations. The typology of 
responses developed above advances on previous work, both 
within the literature on ESG ratings, and broader scholar-
ship on organisational ratings. While recognising discrete 
organisational strategies and tactics (Espeland and Sauder 
2007; Locke 2014; Searcy and Elkhawas 2012), prior litera-
ture has only made limited progress in mapping these across 
different entities. An advantage of our approach is that it not 
only helps us to identify different generic types of response, 
but to locate common factors which might better explain 
possible heterogeneity.
Our findings also have implications for theory. Several 
theoretical mechanisms previously invoked in the litera-
ture—including reactivity and isomorphism—emphasise 
conformity to organisational ratings (e.g. Sharkey and Brom-
ley 2014.). The results of the present paper do not entirely 
contradict these predictions. However, consistent with Pol-
lock et al.’s (2018) work on rankings in the domain of enter-
prise solutions, they underscore the need to acknowledge 
the agency of actors in theorising organisational responses 
to external evaluations. More specifically, our paper points 
to an understanding of firms (and their managers) as cal-
culative actors, whose approach is strongly shaped by self-
assessments of the reputational, financial and strategic value 
of conforming to ESG ratings. This is not to deny the influ-
ence of a corporation’s institutional environment arising, for 
example, from peers who may contribute to defining appro-
priate levels of ESG performance. Yet, it is nevertheless 
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apparent that corporate responses are underpinned by a pri-
mary stakeholder-oriented, “materiality motivation” (Blow-
field and Murray 2019), one which may result in resistance 
to ESG ratings where they are poorly aligned with business 
objectives.
This paper also speaks to wider debates about the sub-
stantive impact of ESG ratings (Gauthier and Wooldridge 
2018; Oekom 2017; Shvarts et al. 2018). ESG ratings can, 
in certain cases, contribute to the incorporation of new CSR 
issues into firms’ policy, practice and strategy; provoke inter-
nal organisational change required to more effectively opera-
tionalise business ethics and sustainability; and elevate the 
strategic importance of addressing ESG issues. Yet our find-
ings sound a cautionary note about the degree to which such 
dynamics unequivocally translate into substantive improve-
ments in sustainability performance. Even amongst those 
companies which adjusted to ratings, the main response was 
through actions centred on improved disclosures, with most 
respondents denying a significant impact on underlying E, 
S or G aspects. Indeed, the requirements of SRAs are only 
one factor influencing corporations’ CSR policies, practices 
and performances, and rarely the most important. In drawing 
these conclusions, our paper provides support to more criti-
cal accounts of informational governance, which challenge 
the idea that neoliberal practices of disclosure are sufficient 
to bring about significant changes in CSR-related behaviour 
(Christophers 2017; Leung and Snell 2019).
Our findings also have implications for business ethics. 
We found little evidence that entities had responded to ESG 
ratings by reflecting on, or rethinking, their values, ethical 
positions or principles. At one level, this is unsurprising: 
ESG ratings are not a “Polanyian” vehicle promulgated by 
civil society to (re-)embed societal values into the market 
(Klooster 2010). Rather, they are mostly commercial data 
products, increasingly marketed to investors on the grounds 
that they help in decision-making by providing material 
information on non-financial E, S and G factors. Yet herein 
lies two dangers of ratings. One is that, through their specific 
framing of ESG as a “business” issue, ratings run the risk of 
reducing ethical aspects to a commercial, calculative logic 
(Fleischman et al. 2019). This, in turn, may have the effect 
of “crowding out” ethics-based decision-making. Another 
closely related risk is that, by emphasising (and even 
rewarding) goal attainment in terms of scoring on meas-
urable criteria, ESG ratings might distract attention away 
from ethical dimensions (Ims et al. 2014; Moore and Gino 
2015). Work in other domains has documented how perfor-
mance measurement may even lead to unethical behaviour 
as actors find ways of manipulating evaluations (e.g. Graf 
et al. 2019). To the extent that some firms in our sample 
appear to have gamed ratings, such observations receive a 
degree of endorsement.
Similarly, our paper raises ethical concerns about the 
interests served by the current ratings regime, characterised 
by multiple SRAs. For rated firms, responding to multiple 
information requests on an increasingly large set of E, S and 
G aspects can be demanding, implying an opportunity cost 
of resources which might be more productively deployed 
elsewhere. This includes on other CSR-related activities. 
The multiplicity of requests from SRAs, together with their 
methodologies and scores, can also engender frustration, 
resentment and resistance which runs the risk of creating 
issue fatigue with corporate sustainability and ethics (Baden 
et al. 2009). This does not mean that ESG ratings are inher-
ently antithetical to ethical business. A case in point: ratings 
are a potentially important tool which investors can use to 
shape the behaviour of firms in ways more closely aligned 
with their own ethical principles (Jackson et al. 2019). Rat-
ings can also reveal ethical practice, as evidenced by certain 
corporations’ principled stance not to cynically “play the 
ratings game”, resisting them where they were felt not to 
positively contribute to addressing important firm-specific 
sustainability issues. Nevertheless, the ethical implications 
of what may seem a technical, innocuous and even virtuous 
enterprise of evaluating firms’ ESG performance should be 
subject to critical inspection.
This paper is by no means the last word on ESG ratings. 
More work is needed to explore, document and unpack 
typologies of corporate responses across a wider range of 
geographic and organisational settings. There is additional 
scope for more anthropological work to explore the micro-
dynamics of corporate responses (c.f. Arjaliès and Bansal 
2018). Likewise, there is scope for complementary quanti-
tative work, which examines the determinants of corporate 
responses across a larger sample of firms. Given the appar-
ent frustration with the demands of rating agencies, it also 
seems apt to identify those information requests, interac-
tions and feedbacks which productively inform superior CSR 
practice and performance, and those which largely engender 
resistance or gaming strategies. From an applied perspec-
tive, there is furthermore a need for work which examines 
how rating agencies could coordinate their data collection 
activities, as well as focus their efforts around sustainability 
aspects which are more financially material to corporations 
and investors. By addressing these aspects, it is the authors’ 
hope that it might be possible to increase the “good” of ESG 
ratings, whilst reducing the “bad” (Rindova et al. 2018).
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Appendix 1: Companies’ Response 
Assessment Scale
We categorised companies’ responses to ESG ratings by 
evaluating two variables:
(a) The degree of compliance: capturing adjustments to 
policies, processes and practices put in place by com-
panies according to the criteria established by SRAs.
(b) The degree of engagement: capturing the level of inter-
action between companies and ESG SRAs.
To score each company on these respective variables, 
we developed sixfold classificatory schemes on a − 3 to + 3 
scale (see Tables 3 and 4).
Table 3  Degree of compliance
Classificatory descriptor
− 3 No changes to corporate policy, process or practice. The company believes that raters’ priorities are not aligned with company priorities 
and shows an indifferent, even hostile, attitude to ratings
− 2 No significant changes to corporate policy, process or practice. Company believes that the effort of meeting raters’ requirements is not 
worth the cost, and does not bring added value
− 1 Only minor changes to corporate policy, process or practice, with company seeking to avoid making any significant adjustments in response 
to ratings
1 The company takes ratings into account and changes aspects of CSR-related policy, process or practice, albeit only in communicative 
aspects related to reporting/disclosure. Implementation of some investments for the compilation of the questionnaires and sustainability 
reporting (e.g. in terms of recruitment and training of people working in the CSR/sustainability unit)
2 Same as 1 (above), but the firm also activates a limited number of changes to CSR-related policy, process or practice where consistent with 
corporate priorities and strategy
3 The company makes several changes in CSR-related policy, practice and strategy, and activates new organisational processes to meet SRA 
requests. Some evidence that the company makes use of ratings as an instrument of self-governance
Table 4  Degree of engagement
Classificatory descriptor
− 3 Company ignores outright SRAs’ requests, with complete absence of intention to initiate a dialogue with raters
− 2 Responses delivered only to highly regarded questionnaires, but without any dialogue with SRAs
− 1 Responses delivered to almost all questionnaire requests, but no dialogue with SRAs sought
1 Company responses delivered to all questionnaires and evidence of attempts to interact with some SRAs on an occasional basis
2 Responses delivered to all the questionnaires and a regular dialogue with specific agencies
3 Dialogue and regular engagement with many SRAs, also involving other corporate functions/divisions beyond the sustainability team
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